The United Kingdom's Leasehold Valuation Tribunal hears extension and enfranchisement cases between landlords (freeholders) and tenants (leaseholders). In these cases, the two parties argue about the terms of housing lease extensions of up to 90 years in length, and about enfranchisements to convert leasehold contracts of speci…c durations to perpetual ownership freeholds. The widely-followed decisions of the leasehold valuation tribunal provide a unique insight into household-level variation in expectations of long-run discount rates and cash- ‡ows, and set bounds on the prices that market participants may be willing to pay for housing over long periods of time. We use the record of decisions since 1995 to extract information about long-run cash- ‡ow and discount rate expectations in this unique setting, which requires no estimation, but has real stakes for the participants in these negotiations. We …nd evidence that the discount rate associated with these decisions causes values of properties discounted for long periods (above 90 years) to be close to zero.
Introduction
How do economic agents discount cash ‡ows that materialize very many years into the future? This is a central question in many areas of economics. Calculations involving such long-run discount rates are not only important in areas of …nance such as pensions and insurance. They are also critical inputs into the deeply important debates surrounding the value that society does and should place on our natural environment, see for example Weitzman (1998) , and Stern et al. (2006) .
Despite the importance of long-run discounting, there is little available direct evidence about the long-run discount rates that agents actually use. The available maturity of long-term bonds is generally too low to extract useful evidence, and there are few other assets that one can generally use to extract this information.
Recently, using housing market data from the U.K. and Singapore, Giglio, Maggiori, and Stroebel (2014) ingeniously extract information on how houses leased for extremely long periods of time are valued. Using hedonic pricing regressions, they …nd that there are valuation di¤erentials associated with the length of the leasehold term, and attribute part of these di¤erentials to low long-run discount rates.
Our paper also utilizes information from the unique setting in the U.K. to extract information about long-run discount rates. However, we adopt an identi…cation approach that sidesteps some of the tricky issues that plague hedonic pricing regressions.
These issues include unobserved variation in hedonics (such as the control rights associated with particular types of contracts) that may be correlated with the length of the leasehold, as well as the legal framework in the U.K., which empowers leaseholders to extend their leases using a relatively straightforward process. These issues complicate indirect inferences about leasehold discounts, and raise the possibility of interpretation of these discounts as control premia.
Our approach is to collate information from the U.K. Leasehold Valuation Tribunal (LVT). The LVT is a legal dispute resolution body which hears cases in which landlords (freeholders) and tenants (leaseholders) argue about the precise terms for lease extensions and collective enfranchisements. Since 1993, leaseholders have the right, upon payment of a premium, negotiated with the freeholder, to extend leases by up to 90 years and to engage in collective enfranchisement, by which a group of leaseholders purchase the freehold.
1
This unique setting requires no estimation, as leaseholders, freeholders, and the LVT all provide long-run discount rate point estimates. The participants in these negotiations also provide point estimates of valuation di¤erentials between short-and long-term leasehold properties. These data are far better than survey data, as they comprise real and high stakes for the participants in these negotiations.
The fact that there are lease extension and enfranchisement rights does not necessarily imply that leasehold and freehold properties should be priced similarly. The key element is that when tenants decide to extend or collectively enfranchise, they are required to compensate the landlord in a fair fashion. If long-run discount rates are indeed very low, the premium will be high, corresponding to the present value of future cash ‡ows, discounted at a low rate. This is where the widely-followed decisions taken by the LVTs have an important role in setting expectations in the U.K. housing market.
2 Say, for example, that a landlord discounts the future at a far lower rate than his or her tenants. The past decisions of the LVT help to set market expectations about the level of societally "reasonable" premia (and hence long-run discount rate and cash- ‡ow expectations).
In addition, the distance between the tenant's proposal and the landlord's proposal also helps to bound the tenant's expected transactions costs in going to an LVT rather than accepting the landlord's proposal.
Using a record of the decisions available from the LVTs from 1995, we …nd evidence that the valuation of leasehold properties decreases substantially with the length of time over which they are discounted. This evidence is complemented by the high discount rates applied to per-period cash- ‡ows, another output from the LVT data. This results 1 See Appendix A for the exact wording of the relevant legislation, which is the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act, and subsequent amendments.
2 See Appendix B for selected press articles about legislation in this area and the role of the LVT between 1992 and 2009. Figure A. 1. shows statistics about the number of articles including the words "leasehold valuation tribunal" from 1993 to the present listed in the major press outlets in the U.K. 3 in the terminal value of properties discounted for long periods (anything after roughly 90 years) to be close to zero. We also …nd intriguing evidence that the per-period discount rate applied to cash ‡ows appears slightly positively correlated with the total length of the term over which the discount rate is applied.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section describes the data that we use in this study. The subsequent section describes the anatomy of a typical leasehold extension. The fourth section discusses our results, and the …nal section Disagreements between the two parties generally concern di¤ering estimates of the future value of the property and/or the appropriate discount rate at which to discount future cash ‡ows accruing to the freeholder. These disputes are settled through the LVT's decisions.
The LVT dataset we have collected covers a sample of 460 decisions, each of which contains expert estimates of the leasehold property's freehold value, estimated future sale prices, and the discount rates at which future cash ‡ows are to be discounted back to the present. The dispute resolution setting means that there are di¤erent assessments of each of these variables across decisions, from the leaseholder, the freeholder, and …nally, the verdict from the LVT, which could be di¤erent from either of these assessments for every one of these variables.
This dataset currently covers a subset of all LVT court decisions, from the period between 1995 and 2006. We are in the process of updating this information to the present day.
In Table 1 , we present the main variables contained in the available text releases of 5 LVT court case decisions.
In Table 2 we report a set of summary statistics pertaining to our newly compiled In Panel B of the table, we show that the average remaining lease term in our sample equals 60 years and the observations range from a minimum of 2 years to a maximum of 123 years. The discount rates used in the calculation have a mean of 8.7 percent and reach up to 13 percent, never falling below 5.3 percent. The estimated percent valuation di¤erential between V t;t+T 2 and V t;t+T 1 decided by the LVT -the "lease discounts"-range from 0 to 95.5 percent, with an average of 16.9 percent. The minimum discount of 0 suggests that for at least one case, the 90-year lease extension or enfranchisement does not seem to lead to an increase in the market value.
Anatomy of a Leasehold Extension
Henceforth, we use the following notation: V t;t+T 1 and V t;t+T 2 Value of a leasehold at time t, of duration t + T i , for lease extension of length T 2 T 1 .
Expected traded price of the freehold, at t + T i .
Per-period ground rent.
r and r Discount rates for ground rent and reversion, respectively.
Typical lease extension and collective enfranchisement cases are based on the following implied timeline:
6 and Three components enter the calculation of the premium payable for a lease extension:
1. Foregone ground rent:
3. Marriage value:
aggregate interests under the new lease
aggregate interests under the old lease Finally, the premium payable is given by the expression: 4 Results Figure 1 summarizes the spectrum of lease contracts in our dataset. The …gure shows the distribution of the remaining leasehold terms across the contracts subject to LVT decisions. There is better representation of the low end of the range of terms than the higher end, but most observations fall within the 60 to 80 year range.
Panel A of Figure 2 shows time variation in the length of the leasehold terms about which disputes occur. There is a small tendency for disputes about short-lease properties to have become less prevalent through time. Panel B shows that the highest applied discount rates appear to have reduced over time, suggesting that it will be important to control for time variation in the mean discount rate applied by the LVT.
Panel C shows that the lease discounts have been decreasing during more recent years, which is consistent with the increase in lease terms mentioned above. Figure 3 plots the LVT outcome discount rates against the remaining terms for 8 each of the decisions. It appears that there is no tendency for the discount rate to be negatively correlated with the remaining term of the leasehold contract. If anything, there appears to be a slight positive correlation between the remaining term and the per year discount rate applied to ground rent and other cash ‡ows. This goes to the heart of the question -it does not appear from the LVT decisions as if the long-distant future is being discounted at a lower rate than the present.
In Table 3 , each year, we regress the rates r in each of the decisions on T 1 . In all years, the relationship between the two is positive. The positive relationship is very pronounced in the …rst half of the sample and only weakly statistically signi…-cant towards the end. This con…rms that if anything, the long-distant future is being discounted at slightly higher rates than the short-term, in the LVT decisions.
The estimated time path of discount rates (which can be seen from the pattern of …xed e¤ects) is strongly downward-sloping, mirroring the actual evolution of nominal interest rates in the UK during this period. In terms of the actual levels of the discount rates, we observe values between 5.3 and 13 percent. Taken at face value, they are surprisingly high and we can best describe this as a puzzle, probably re ‡ecting a perception of a high housing . Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the remaining lease term, and the lease discounts. Importantly, we observe a pronounced ‡attening of this lease discount up to a horizon of 90 years. This contrasts with the evidence from hedonic pricing regressions uncovered by Giglio, Maggiori, and Stroebel (2014) . Table 4 reports the results from a simple linear regression of the lease discounts on the remaining term, in which we observe that the negative relationship is robust through time. Since our data sample is limited, we view this as reassuring evidence about the quality and consistency of the judgements underlying the decisions of the LVTs.
Conclusions
We use the unique setting of the U.K. Leasehold Valuation Tribunal to shed light on the important issue of long-run discounting. Using a sample of 460 decisions from the LVT, we …nd that discount rates are high, and if anything, have a slight tendency to increase with the length of the term over which the discounting is done. The terminal values produced by these discount rates are negatively sloping in the length of the term over which the discounting is done, reaching zero at roughly 90 years. This is a very preliminary draft, and in future versions, we intend to investigate the extent to which there is disagreement between the leaseholder and the freeholder over discount rates and valuation di¤erentials at long horizons. We also intend to use the relationship between the per period discount rate and the valuation di¤erentials extracted from the data to shed light on cash- ‡ow expectations at very long horizons.
Finally, we intend to extend the data up to the most recent period, and carefully study time-variation in the observed long-run discount rates. 1. LE denotes leasehold extensions.
2. CE denotes collective enfranchisement, referring to section (x) of the 1993 Act.
3. The marriage value is given as a fraction of the premium.
4. Landlords and tenants often disagree about the discount rates used in the calculation and the lease discounts. 
where i is an index of LVT lease extension court cases, r i;t is the rate used in the settlement calculation, T i;1 is the remaining lease term and t indicates the year during which the LVT decision was taken.
The procedure is equivalent to running a regression of discount rates on remaining terms, separately for each year. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
where i is an index of LVT lease extension court cases, T 1;i is the remaining lease term and t indicates the year during which the LVT decision was taken. discount i;t is equal to
. For example, a discount value of 5% implies that the marketable value of the property under the old (shorter) lease is 5% less than it is expected to be under the new (longer) lease. The procedure is equivalent to running a regression of lease discounts on remaining terms, separately for each year. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. "The Lords ruled unanimously that tenants planning to extend their leases or purchase the freehold of a leasehold house will not be subject to landlords'claims that "hope value" (the potential uplift in price caused by a special purchaser, such as a tenant, making a bid in the future) should be added to the price. [This decision] clari…ed a number of valuation issues in this complex area of the law. It is good news for most tenants wishing to purchase the freehold of a leasehold house or to extend their lease as they will now have to pay less for their freehold or lease extension." 
